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INTRODUCTION

Revenue Rulings 84-1521 and 84-1532 held that tax exemptions
under the United States-Netherlands Income Tax Convention, as
extended to the Netherlands Antilles (the "Antilles"), did not apply to
* The author acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Professor Russell K. Osgood,
of the Cornell Law School, in the preparation of this Note.
1. Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984-2 C.B. 381.
2. Rev. Rul. 84-153, 1984-2 C.B. 383.
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interest payments received by two Antilles subsidiaries from U.S. corporations. Beyond imposing a 30 percent withholding tax on the

interest U.S. corporations paid to Antilles subsidiaries-the Rulings
raise three important legal issues: 3 (1) when should a foreign finance
subsidiary be disregarded for tax purposes; (2) how should general
treaty language be interpreted; and (3) what effect should a change in
revenue laws have on existing tax treaties. 4 These issues arise not only
in transactions financed through the Antilles, but also when the separate identity of a foreign subsidiary is challenged and when interpreting tax treatiesA
This Note evaluates Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153 in three
parts. Part II provides background that explains the activities leading
to the issuance of Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153. Part III
describes the facts of the Revenue Rulings. Part IV analyzes the major
issues raised by the two Rulings. Subsection A of Part IV discusses
3. International tax specialists criticized these Rulings for disregarding judicial precedent and established rules of treaty interpretation, and for violating international law by
unilaterally deciding a fundamental treaty issue. See, eg., Cole & Musher, Rev. Rul 84152, 84-153 and GCM37940 Departfrom U.S. Treaty Obligations,14 TAx MGMT. INT'L J.
265 (1985); Fogarasi & Renfroe, Is the Benefit of the U.S.-NetherlandsAntilles Treaty Terminated for Financing Companies?, 13 TAx MGMT. INT'L J. 442 (1984); James, Aiken
Industries Revisited, 64 TAxEs 131 (1986).
4. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 adds a branch profits tax to the Code. Although this
provision has no direct relevance to this discussion, the Conference Committee indicated
that it approved of the results reached in Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153. Specifically,
the Joint Committee Report provides:
The conferees are concerned that the branch-level interest provision may lead to
increased use of back-to-back loans by non-treaty residents and improper characterization of interbranch funds by both treaty and nontreaty residents to avoid U.S.
tax. The conferees wish to emphasize that back-to-back loans, as generallyprovided
underpresent law, will be collapsed by the I.R.S., and the ultimate recipient, if not
treaty protected, will be subject to U.S. tax (emphasis added).
CONF. COMM. REP., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1986] 41
Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) at 11-60 (Sept. 21, 1986).
5. The Netherlands Antilles (the "Antilles") has long been a leading tax haven. See
Frank, New Hubfor an Old Web, FORBES, Apr. 7, 1986, at 11; Gelinas, Tax Considerations
for US. Corporations Using Finance Subsidiaries to Borrow Funds Abroad, 7 J. CORP.
TAX'N 230, 239 (1978); Lederman, The Offshore Finance Subsidiary: An Analysis of the
CurrentBenefits and Problems, 51 J. CORP. TAX'N 86 (1979). These six small islands in the
Caribbean became a popular location for the formation of foreign finance subsidiaries for
several reasons. First, Antilles and the United States have a bilateral tax treaty that
exempts from U.S. withholding tax interest income received by an Antilles corporation
from a U.S. entity. See infra note 24 and accompanying text. Second, the Antilles does not
impose withholding taxes on interest paid by Antilles corporations to foreign bondholders.
Lederman, supra, at 86. Third, the Antilles has a relatively low income tax rate of 24 to 30
percent. Netherlands Antilles Profit Tax Ordinance, art. 15. Fourth, article XII of the
United States-Netherlands Antilles Treaty exempts from U.S. taxation interest by an Antilles corporation. See United States-Netherlands Income Tax Treaty infra note 24, art. XII.
Consequently, the availability of United States Foreign Tax Credit for income taxes paid by
the Antilles subsidiary made the Antilles income tax effectively cost free to the U.S. parent.
(For a detailed discussion of the tax benefits of Netherlands Antilles finance subsidiaries,
see generally Lederman, supra.) Finally, the Antilles is well known for its stable political
and economic environment and its secrecy. See infra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.

1987]

REVENUE RULINGS

the separate identity doctrine as it relates to these Rulings; subsection
B considers the general canons of treaty interpretation; subsection C
addresses the effects of an underlying change in revenue laws on bilateral tax treaties. The Note concludes that Revenue Ruling 84-152 was
correctly decided, but that Revenue Ruling 84-153 was incorrectly
decided.
II. BACKGROUND
The U.S. Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") imposes a 30 per-

cent tax on interest received by a foreign corporation from sources
within the United States.6 The Code imposes the tax to the extent

such interest is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or
business within U.S. territory. 7 The payor of the income deducts and
withholds the tax at the source.8 Arguably, this withholding tax
6. I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1), 881(a)(1) (CCH 1986).
7. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 127 Stat. 494 (1984),
added §§ 871(h) and 881(c) to the Code, thereby repealing the 30 percent withholding tax
on portfolio interest. See Granwell, Repeal of30 Percent Withholding Tax on Interest Paid
to Foreigners,13 TAx MGMT. INT'L J. 306 (1984). A major motivation for the repeal was
to enable the United States government, with its enormous budget deficit, to reduce the rate
of interest it pays on bonds held by foreigners.
The formation of foreign finance subsidiaries was an inefficient method for United States
corporations to take advantage of the securities offered on the foreign bond or Eurobond
market. Furthermore, such devices led to problems of third country abuse of tax treaties.
The repeal provisions affirmed the validity of using foreign finance subsidiaries to avoid
withholding tax, but only for obligations issued before June 22, 1984. See JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION 98TH CONG., 2d SEss., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, 397-98 (Comm. Print 1985).

The repeal applies to registered debt and bearer debt. I.R.C. §§ 871(h)(2), 881(c)(2)
(CCH 1986). Registered debt was exempted provided the issuer received a statement that
the securities' beneficial owner is not a United States citizen. Id. §§ 871(h)(2)(B)(ii),
881(c)(2)(B)(ii). Bearer debt was exempted from withholding tax if it is issued in compliance with the requirements of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(TEFRA), as provided in I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(B). Id. §§ 871(h)(2)(A), 881(c)(2)(A). These
restrictions were meant to prevent U.S. taxpayers from escaping tax on debt instruments.
For interest to qualify for the repeal provisions, it had to be "portfolio interest." Id.
§§ 871(h)(1), 881(c)(1). Portfolio interest included interest on an obligation that is not in
registered form. Id. § 871(h)(2)(A)(i). It must also meet the reporting requirements set out
in I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(B) to ensure that U.S. taxpayers are not the payees on the foreign
obligations. Id. § 871(h)(2)(A)(ii). I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(B) provides that interest on an obligation not in registered form must be payable only outside the United States and its possessions. Id. § 163(f)(2)(B)(ii)(I). Such obligation must include on its face a statement that
any U.S. person who holds such obligation will be subject to the limitation under the U.S.
income tax laws. Id. § 163(f)(2)(B)(ii)(II). These reporting provisions ensured that U.S.
taxpayers do not claim foreign nationality to evade U.S. taxes.
Under the Act, not all interest was exempt. Non-exempt interest included the following
situations. Interest that a bank received on an extension of credit made pursuant to a loan
agreement entered into in the ordinary course of trade or business. Id. § 881(c)(3)(A).
Interest received by a controlled foreign corporation from a related person. Id.
§ 881(c)(3)(C). Interest received by a person who has or is considered to have a 10 percent
interest in the U.S. issuer under § 871(h)(3). Id. §§ 871(h)(3), 881(c)(3)(B).
8. Id. §§ 1441, 1442.
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impairs the ability of U.S. corporations to compete in foreign capital
markets because of the resulting decrease in investor returns.
Although several statutory exceptions to the withholding tax
requirement existed, 9 it was not until passage of the Tax Reform Act
of 1984 that generally U.S. corporations were not required to withhold
30 percent tax on interest paid to non-resident alien individuals and
foreign corporations. 10 Prior to the 1984 reform, U.S. corporations
had created foreign subsidiaries in countries with which the United
States had tax treaties exempting, or significantly reducing, foreignearned interest from the 30 percent withholding tax." This device
enabled U.S. corporations to avoid the withholding tax and to take
12
advantage of favorable conditions in the foreign bond market.
9. Before the Tax Reform Act of 1984, exceptions to the withholding tax requirements included: 1) interest from deposits with persons carrying on the banking business,
I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(1)(A), (c) (1984); 2) interest received from a resident alien individual or
U.S. corporation earning less than 20 percent of its gross income from sources in the
United States, idL § 861(a)(1)(B) and 3) interest received from a foreign corporation when it
less than 50 percent of the corporation's gross income from all sources in the prior three
taxable years was effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business, id. § 861(a)(1)(C) and
4) income derived from a foreign central bank of issue from bank's acceptances, id. § 861
(a)(i)(E).
10. Id §§ 871(h), 881(c). Since the effective date of July 18, 1984 for repealing the 30
percent withholding tax on portfolio interest, U.S. corporations have been able to structure
directly debt financing transactions in foreign markets. For a discussion of the repeal, see
supra note 6.
11. The use of a foreign finance subsidiary provided the means of avoiding United
States withholding tax on interest paid to foreign investors. In the absence of a treaty,
interest paid by any U.S. company to the foreign finance subsidiary would be from U.S.
sources and thus subject to the 30 percent withholding tax. I.R.C. §§ 871(a), 881(a) (1984).
Tax treaties generally reduce or eliminate the 30 percent withholding requirement. See,
e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 31, 1975, United StatesUnited Kingdom, art. 11, 31 U.S.T. 5668, 5680, T.I.A.S. No. 9682, amended by Additional
Protocol, Aug. 26, 1976, 31 U.S.T. 5668, T.I.A.S. No. 9682, amended by Additional Protocol, March 15, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 5668, T.I.A.S. No. 9682; see also Osgood, infra note 136, at
259. Such devices were initially developed in the 1960's in response to the U.S. balance of
payments program, which imposed various controls on capital outflows. This program
induced U.S. corporations to finance their foreign investments through overseas borrowing
because such companies were unable to raise capital on domestic markets for foreign
investors.
The balance of payments program consisted of two elements: the 1963 Interest Equalization Tax (the "IET"), and the 1968 Foreign Direct Investment Program. The IET taxed
the acquisition of foreign securities by U.S. citizens. Taxable acquisitions include stock and
long-term debt obligations of foreign obligors. The 1968 Foreign Direct Investment Program restricted direct investment by U.S. persons of domestic funds in foreign countries.
For a discussion of the U.S. balance of payments program, see Boffa, InternationalFinance
Subsidiaries, Tax Mgmt. (BNA) 2d ser., § 215, at A29-43 (1972). From 1971 to 1974,
direct borrowing abroad by U.S. corporations was permitted because the Code had been
amended to provide that interest on certain U.S. corporate obligations would be treated as
foreign source income and, thus, be exempt from U.S. withholding tax. The Interest
Equalization Tax expired in June 1974. Gelinas, supra note 5, at 235-36.
12. The foreign bond market or Eurobond market offered long-term debt securities
that have a shorter term than securities offered on U.S. markets. During the 1960's the
typical maturity for these securities was ten years as compared to twenty-five to thirty years
for U.S. securities. The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the Purpose of Evading Income
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Initially, the U.S. government accepted these transactions
because they enabled domestic entities to gain access to debt instruments on favorable terms. 13 Over time, the use of foreign finance subsidiaries in "tax haven" jurisdictions became increasingly attractive to
U.S. investors. 14 The United States recognized that these financing
arrangements were of substantial economic and financial importance
to the country, influencing both the pattern and volume of foreign

investment. 15
In recent years, however, the U.S. government has been reluctant
to condone foreign finance subsidiary transactions in tax haven jurisdictions. These arrangements came into disfavor because persons from

countries, not a party to a tax treaty with the United States, took
advantage of the treaties' benefits. Moreover, U.S. taxpayers, masquerading as foreigners, attempted to employ these devices to evade
U.S. taxation. 16 Consequently, the Treasury Department endeavored

to renegotiate several treaties to decrease the attractiveness of interest
withholding tax havens. 17 In addition, the Internal Revenue Service
(the "Service") issued certain revenue rulings in an attempt to curb the
use of foreign finance subsidiaries in tax haven jurisdictions. 8 This
process culminated with the issuance of Revenue Ruling 84-152 and

Revenue Ruling 84-153.
III. REVENUE RULINGS 84-152 AND 84-153
Revenue Ruling 84-15219 involved a Swiss parent company that
Taxes: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 269, 294 (1979) (statement of H. David Rosenbloom, International Tax Counsel, Department of Treasury) [hereinafter Rosenbloom House Hearings].
In addition, the foreign bond market offers other advantages, including earlier redemption
than comparable U.S. securities and debt covenants that are more flexible than those for
comparable obligations available on the U.S. market. Also, public offerings are much faster
on the Eurobond market than on the U.S. market, and the foreign bond market may provide a source of foreign currency for United States corporations. See Gelinas, supra note 5,
at 231 n.3.
13. See Rosenbloom House Hearings,supra note 1-2, at 281-94.
14. The Antilles and the British Virgin Islands became two popular tax havens because
of especially favorable local tax features. See sources cited supra note 5; see also Vogel,
Bernstein & Nitsche, Inward Investments in Securities and Direct OperationsThrough the
British Virgin Islands: How Serious a Rival to the NetherlandsAntilles Paradise,34 TAX L.
RnV. 321 (1978).
15. Rosenbloom House Hearings,supra note 12, at 281.
16. See id. at 278; Diamond & Diamond, NetherlandsAntilles, in 3 TAx HAVENS OF
THE WORLD 1, 10 (1986).
17. Chapeton, Chapeton Outlines Treasury Policy on Treaty Shopping, 19 TAX NOTES
(Tax Analyst) No. 3, at 250 (April 18, 1986).
18. In addition to the subject Revenue Rulings, see Rev. Rul. 79-65, 1979-1 C.B. 458
(concluding that a domestic corporation must provide adequate information to establish
that its relationship with the Antilles' parent was not formed solely for the purpose of tax
avoidance).
19. Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984-2 C.B. 381.
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maintained two wholly-owned subsidiaries: one in the United States
and the other in the Antilles. 20 The U.S. subsidiary needed funds to

improve its production capabilities. On August 1, 1984, the Swiss parent lent funds to the Antilles subsidiary. 21 Thereafter, the Antilles
subsidiary re-lent the funds to the U.S. corporation. 22 The U.S. subsidiary paid interest to the Antilles corporation at an 11 percent rate;

the Antilles corporation paid interest to the Swiss parent at a rate of
10 percent. 23 The Antilles subsidiary thus earned a profit on the 1
percent spread.
The parties claimed that the U.S. subsidiary's interest payments

were entitled to exemption from withholding taxes under article
VIII(l) of the United States-Netherlands Income Tax Convention as
extended to the Antilles (the "United States-Antilles Treaty"). 24 The
Treaty provided:
Interest (on bonds, securities, notes, debentures or on any form of indebtedness)... derived from sources within the United States by a resident or corporation of the Netherlands... not engaged in trade or business in the United
States through a permanent establishment, shall be exempt from United States
25
tax ....

Revenue Ruling 84-152 held that the interest paid by the U.S. corporation to the Antilles corporation did not qualify for the withholding tax

exemption under article VIII(1) of the United States-Antilles Treaty26
because the Antilles corporation did not have "complete dominion
and control" over the interest payment-a requirement implied by the
words "derived ...by" in article VIII(l) of the Treaty. 27 Rather, the
Antilles subsidiary was "merely a conduit for the passage of [the U.S.
20. Id. at 382.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Convention with respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes, Apr. 29,
1948, United States-Netherlands, 62 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1855, supplemented by Protocol Facilitating Extension of the Convention to the Netherlands Antilles, June 15, 1955, 6
U.S.T. 3696, T.I.A.S. No. 3366, modified by Agreement Relating to the Convention and
Protocol, June 24-Nov. 10, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 3703, T.I.A.S. No. 3367, modified and supplemented by Protocol Relating to the Extension to the Netherlands Antilles, Oct. 23, 1963,
15 U.S.T. 1900, T.I.A.S. No. 5665, modified and supplemented by Convention Relating to
the United States-Netherlands Convention, Dec. 30, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 896, T.I.A.S. No.
6051 [hereinafter United States-Netherlands Income Tax Treaty]. A new income tax treaty
between the United States and the Antilles was signed on August 8, 1986. Article 11 of the
new treaty reduces the interest withholding tax benefits that existed under the former
treaty. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, August 8, 1986, United StatesNetherlands Antilles, art. 11, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties
(CCII) at 589714. As of this writing, however, the new treaty has not yet entered into
force.
25. United States-Netherlands Income Tax Treaty, supranote 24, art. VIII(1) (emphasis added).
26. Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984-2 C.B. 381, 382.
27. 1984-2 C.B. at 382. See United States-Netherlands Income Tax Treaty, supra note
24, art. VIII(1).
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subsidiary's] interest payments to [the Swiss parent]. ' 2 8 The Ruling
stated that the primary purpose for the Antilles subsidiary's involvement in the transaction was "to attempt to obtain the benefits of Article VIII(l) interest exemption.., thus, resulting in the avoidance of
United States tax."'29 Consequently, the Antilles subsidiary lacked
"sufficient business or economic purpose to overcome the conduit
nature of the transaction, even though it [could] be demonstrated that
the transaction serve[d] some business or economic purpose. ' 30
Revenue Ruling 84-153 31 involved a slightly different factual situation from that in Revenue Ruling 84-152 because the Antilles subsidiary made public bond offerings. In Revenue Ruling 84-153, a U.S.
parent corporation maintained United States and Antilles subsidiaries.3 2 The U.S. subsidiary needed funds to increase its working capital
so it could improve its production facilities. 33 The parent corporation
wanted to obtain the funds outside the United States because of lower
interest rates. 34 The Antilles subsidiary, therefore, issued bearer bonds
to foreign persons in two public offerings, on July 1, 1984, and on
September 1, 1984.35 The Antilles corporation lent the proceeds of the
offering to the U.S. subsidiary at an interest rate that was one percentage point higher than the rate payable to the foreign bond holders,
36
thus retaining the spread.
As in Revenue Ruling 84-152, Revenue Ruling 84-153 held that
the interest paid by the U.S. subsidiary to the Antilles corporation did
not qualify for the withholding tax exemption under article VIII(l) of
the United States-Antilles Treaty because the Antilles corporation did
not "deriv[e] the interest," but was merely "a conduit for the passage
of [the U.S. subsidiary's] interest payments to the foreign bondholders. '37 The Ruling stated that the primary purpose for involving the
Antilles subsidiary in the transaction was to obtain the exemption pro38
vided by article VIII(l) and thereby avoid U.S. taxation.
28. Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984-2 C.B. 381, 382.
29. Id.
30. Id. The Service concluded that the interest payments were subject to a 5 percent
U.S. withholding tax under article VII(I) of the United States-Switzerland Income Tax
Treaty. Id.
31. Rev. Rul. 84-153, 1984-2 C.B. 383.
32. Id. at 383.
33. Id.
34. IId
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. The result of Revenue Ruling 84-153 was the same with respect to the bond
issuances on both July 1, 1984, and September 1, 1984; nonetheless, because the Code had
been amended during the ensuing period, the Service treated these two issuances differently. As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 (the "1984 Act"), Congress repealed the 30
percent withholding tax on portfolio interest paid by U.S. corporations to foreign investors
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ANALYSIS

THE SEPARATE TAx IDENTITY DOCTRINE

1. Legal Attacks on Foreign Finance Subsidiaries
Because Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153 effectively disregard
the corporate separateness of the Antilles subsidiary, the Rulings raise
the question of when is it appropriate to disregard the separate identity
of a foreign finance subsidiary. The U.S. government has adopted several arguments to address the problem of separate identity of foreign
finance subsidiaries in light of perceived abuses of tax treaties. The
government's primary concern was that foreign nationals were receiving tax benefits under a treaty to which their home countries were not
a party.3 9 In addition, the government feared that U.S taxpayers were
inaccurately claiming foreign nationality to evade U.S. taxation. 4°
The government hoped to curtail perceived abuses by disregarding the
separate identity of foreign finance subsidiaries.
The government first argued that the foreign finance subsidiary
on bonds issued after July 18, 1984. I.R.C. §§ 871(h), 881(c) (CCH 1986). For a discussion
of the repeal, see supra note 6. The repeal provisions provided for a "safe harbor" date of
June 22, 1984; thus, obligations issued before June 22, 1984, were entitled to the article
VIII exemption. Since the July 1, 1984, issuance occurred before the July 18, 1984, effective
date of repeal of withholding tax and after June 22, 1984, the Service held that interest on
such obligations did not qualify for the repeal of withholding tax on "portfolio interest."
Rev. Rul. 84-153, 1984-2 C.B. 383, 384. This determination meant that bonds issued
between June 22, 1984, and July 18, 1984, were not protected by the safe harbor of the 1984
Act, whereas bonds issued before June 22, 1984, were protected.
To rectify this situation, the Treasury Department, by news release shortly after the
publication of Revenue Ruling 84-153, invited taxpayers who made offerings through the
Antilles between June 18 and July 22, 1984, to seek relief. I.R.S. News Release IR-84-1 10
(Oct. 18, 1984); Announcement 84-105 Based on I.R.S. News Release IR-84-1 10 (Oct. 18,
1984), 1984-46 I.R.B. 57. The Service granted relief in several instances. Priv. Ltr. Ruls.
85-28-031 (April 16, 1985), 85-25-031 (March 22, 1985), 85-20-095 (Feb. 20, 1985), 85-20094 (Feb. 20, 1985), 85-20-093 (Feb. 20, 1985), 85-20-092 (Feb. 20, 1985), 85-20-062 (Feb.
20, 1985), 85-20-061 (Feb. 19, 1985), 85-20-055 (Feb. 19, 1985).
Subsequently, in Rev. Rul. 85-163, 1985-2 C.B. 349, the Service modified the holding of
Revenue Ruling 84-153 (Revenue Ruling 85-163 similarly modified the holding of Revenue
Ruling 84-152) Id Revenue Ruling 85-163 stated that Revenue Ruling 84-153 would not
apply to interest payments made in connection with debt obligations issued prior to October 15, 1984, the date the Ruling was published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin, or interest payments made in connection with debt obligations issued on or after October 15, 1984,
pursuant to a binding written agreement entered into prior to October 15, 1984. Id. These
actions mooted the Ruling's retroactive effect. The second offering was made on September
1, 1984, after the repeal of the withholding tax on portfolio interest's effective date. The
Ruling stated that the September 1, 1984, offering did not meet the reporting requirements
for bearer obligations, a prerequisite for the interest payment to be nontaxable under the
1984 Act. Rev. Rul. 84-153, 1984-2 C.B. 383, 383-84; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text. As a result, the interest payments were treated as paid directly to foreign investors and subject to thirty percent withholding or the applicable treaty rate of the foreign
investors. Rev. Rul. 84-153, 1984-2 C.B. 383, 383-84.
39. Rosenbloom House Hearings,supra note 12, at 278.
40. Diamond & Diamond, supra note 16, at 10.
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was insufficiently or thinly capitalized. 4 1 Both Revenue Rulings 84152 and 84-153 specifically state, however, that the Antilles subsidiaries were not thinly capitalized. 4 2
In its second approach, the government argued that the foreign

finance subsidiary either conducted a trade or business in the United

43
States or had a "permanent establishment" in the United States.

Again, both Rulings state that the Antilles subsidiary was not engaged
in a trade or business in the United States and had no "permanent
44
establishment in the United States."
With the government's first and second approaches ruled out,
Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153 applied the broader "conduit," or
"sham" theory to disregard the separate identity of the Antilles subsidiaries. This theory relies on the premise that the foreign finance sub-

sidiaries are paper corporations, without employees or independent
revenues. 4 5 Significantly, bonds of the subsidiary generally contain a
covenant giving the parent the right to call them if they become sub41. While U.S. capital controls were still in effect, the Service issued a series of rulings
stating that as long as the debt-to-equity ratio of the subsidiary did not exceed five-to-one,
the Service would recognize the indebtedness as the subsidiary's indebtedness and would
treat the subsidiary as a separate corporate entity. See Rev. Rul. 69-377, 1969-2 C.B. 231,
233 (no U.S. withholding tax on interest from foreign subsidiary debt obligation paid to
foreign corporations if less than 20 percent of the foreign subsidiary's gross income is
derived from sources within the United States); see also Rev. Rul. 73-110, 1973-1 C.B. 454;
Rev. Rul. 69-501, 1969-2 C.B. 233. With the easing of U.S. capital controls in 1974 (the
Interest Equalization Tax and the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations lapsed in this
year), the Service revoked the above Rulings and stated that it would determine the validity
of a finance subsidiary on the facts and circumstances of each case. Rev. Rul. 74-464, 19742 C.B. 47. However, the Service, as provided in the Tax Reform Act of 1984, resurrected
the five-to-one debt-to-equity ratio requirement of the earlier Rulings in order for obligations issued before June 22, 1984, to be grandfathered in under the repeal provisions. Rev.
Rul. 86-6, 1986-4 I.R.B. 4. For a discussion of debt-to-equity ratios in other areas of tax
law, see generally Plumb, FederalIncome Tax Significance of CorporateDebt: A Critical
Analysis and Proposal,26 TAX L. REv. 369, 507-19 (1971) (cases in other areas of tax law
indicate that a three-to-one debt-to-equity ratio generally will not be attacked by the
Service).
If a corporation forms a foreign finance subsidiary with a low debt-to-equity ratio, the
Service may still attack it on grounds of thin capitalization when the subsidiary loans the
equity contributed by the parent to lower the subsidiary's debt-to-equity ratio back to the
parent's affiliates. If this occurs, the Service may consider the transaction a reduction in
the parent's investment in the foreign finance subsidiary. Lederman, supra note 5, at 88.
42. Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984-2 C.B. 381, 382; Rev. Rul. 84-153, 1984-2 C.B. 383, 383.
43. Tax treaties generally provide that an exemption from U.S. taxation is not available
if the foreign entity has a permanent establishment in the United States. See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 11, art. 7. If the Service deems the
entity to be conducting a trade or business within the United States, the entity's effectively
connected income is taxed at graduated rates. I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882 (1982). See Gelinas,
supranote 5, at 255; Lederman, supra note 5, at 89; Williams, PermanentEstablishmentsin
the United States, 29 TAx LAW. 277 (1976).
44. Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984-2 C.B. 381, 382; Rev. Rul. 84-153, 1984-2 C.B. at 383.
45. Rosenbloom House Hearings,supra note 12, at 295.
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ject to withholding taxes.46 In addition, the U.S. parent typically
47
guarantees the payment of interest and principal.
2. The Standardsfor DisregardingSeparateIdentity

Although numerous decisions established that the government
ordinarily will not disregard a corporation's identity for tax purposes,
the "sham" or "conduit" theory sometimes has warranted disregarding the separate identity of a foreign finance subsidiary. 48 The established tax standard for evaluating the separate identity of an entity is
lenient.49 An entity "formed for a substantial business purpose or
actually engaged in substantive business activity" will ordinarily have
a separate tax identity. 50
Courts have narrowed the "substantive business activity" test.
Although the permissible amount of activity may be minimal, courts
will disregard the form of the transaction under limited circumstances,5 1 such as "when the taxpayer has conducted business as if he
and the corporation were one and the same, thereby ignoring the fact
that in tax law he and the corporation are considered to be two separate entities."'5 2 This exception does not apply to Revenue Rulings 84152 and 84-153 because presumably the Antilles subsidiaries in question kept separate books and met the formal requirements for separate
corporations.
Two other limitations, discussed later in the analysis, are relevant
to this discussion. Tax authorities may disregard a corporate entity
when the entity assumes the entire risk of loss on the transaction5 3 and
46. Segal & Davis, Repeal of the 30% Withholding Tax on PortfolioInterest, I 1INT'L
TAX J.125, 127 (1985).
47. Gelinas, supra note 5, at 232.
48. See, eg., Burnett v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 415 (1932) (unusual cases may require disregarding the corporate form); Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d
232, 233 (5th Cir. 1970) (the corporate entity will generally be recognized rather than disregarded for tax purposes) (citing New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934)).
49. See, e.g., Republic Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 900, 912 (E.D.
La. 1975), modified, 613 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1980) (the court recognized separate corporate
identity despite lack of corporation telephones, employees, and offices).
50. Bass v. Comm'r, 50 T.C. 595, 600 (1968) (holding a Swiss corporation that signed
working agreements, collected royalties, made investments, and carried out other business
activities was a separate identity for tax purposes); see also National Carbide Corp. v.
Comm'r, 366 U.S. 422 (1949); Moline Properties, Inc. v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 436 (1943);
National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944); Aldon Homes, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 33 T.C. 582 (1959).
51. See, eg., Moline Properties, 319 U.S. at 440 (holding that leasing property and
receiving rental income satisfied the substantive business activity standard); Britt, 431 F.2d
at 235 ("a determination of whether a corporation is to be considered as doing business is
not necessarily dependent upon the quantum of business" (citations omitted)).
52. Britt, 431 F.2d at 233.
53. See Carnation Co. v. Comm'r, 45 T.C. 566 (1966); Rev. Rul. 78-118, 1978-1 C.B.
219, 220; see also infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
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when tax avoidance is the only business purpose for the formation of a
54
corporation and the use of a certain transaction.
3.

Gregory v. Helvering

Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153 relied on Gregory v. Helvering55 and Aiken Industries v. Commissioner56 in concluding that the
Antilles subsidiaries qualified as shams because the requisite business
activity and purpose were absent. The facts of these two Revenue Rulings, however, differ substantially from Gregory and Aiken Industries.
In Gregory, the petitioner temporarily formed a corporation under the
Code's reorganization provisions. The petitioner then transferred valuable shares of stock held by her wholly-owned corporation to this
newly-formed corporation and subsequently liquidated the newlyformed corporation. The purpose of the "reorganization" and liquidation of the temporarily-formed entity was to allow the petitioner to sell
the shares for her individual profit while reducing the tax burden that
would have resulted had the newly formed corporation distributed the
shares to her as an ongoing dividend rather than as a liquidating
57
distribution.
Petitioner in this case formed a corporation solely for the purpose
of achieving tax advantages and liquidated the corporation shortly
after its formation to achieve that purpose. Both formation and utilization of the corporation contravened the purpose of the Code's reorganization provisions. It satisfied neither the minimum activity nor
the business purpose test required for treatment as a separate taxable
entity. The Supreme Court concluded that the newly formed corporation served no corporate or business purpose other than reducing tax
liability and assessed the petitioner with tax.58
Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153 are distinguishable from
Gregory inasmuch as the Antilles subsidiaries in the Revenue Rulings
appeared to have some profit-making potential in the relevant transactions. Furthermore, the taxpayers in the Revenue Rulings did not
appear to have formed the Antilles subsidiaries specifically to engage
54. See infra notes 99-123 and accompanying text; see also Gregory v. Helvering, 293
U.S. 465, 469 (1935); National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1944);
Hospital Corp. of America v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 520 (1983); Ross v. Comm'r, 60 T.C. 569
(1973); Larrabee v. United States, 68-2 U.S.T.C. 9442 (C.D.Cal. 1968); Siegel v. Comm'r,
45 T.C. 566 (1966).
55. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
56. 56 T.C. 925 (1971), acq. on other grounds 1972-2 C.B.1.
57. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 467.
58. Id. at 469.
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in the one transaction the Rulings attack. 59 Also, the Antilles subsidiaries' activities did not contravene the purpose of a revenue statute or
treaty.6° Therefore, citing Gregory as controlling precedent in both
Rulings is not compelling without a more specific explanation as to
how the case resolves the issues presented in the Rulings.
4. Aiken Industries v. Commissioner
Aiken Industries,61 a more appropriate precedent for Revenue
Rulings 84-152 and 84-153, involved a foreign subsidiary formed in a
tax haven jurisdiction. In Aiken Industries, a U.S. corporation borrowed funds from its Bahamian parent.62 The Bahamian parent
assigned the obligation of the U.S. subsidiary to another subsidiary
organized in Honduras. 63 The purpose of this exchange was to provide the Bahamian parent with a zero rate of withholding tax on interest paid by the U.S. corporation under the United States-Honduras
Income Tax Treaty. 64 In return for receipt of the U.S. corporation's
obligation, the Honduran corporation issued its own notes to the
Bahamian parent. 65 The Honduran notes had the same principal
amounts and interest rates as the U.S. subsidiary's notes. 66 The Honduran corporation made no profit on the transaction because the U.S.
corporation paid the interest to the Honduran corporation which, in
67
turn, paid all interest to the Bahamian parent.
Although Aiken Industries noted that a tax avoidance motive
alone is not sufficient to prevent application of an international tax
59. This is especially true of Revenue Ruling 84-153 because the Antilles subsidiary in

that Ruling was established in 1982. Rev. Rul. 84-153, 1984-2 C.B. 383, 383. Revenue
Ruling 84-152 does not state when the Antilles subsidiary was formed.
60. The Service may claim that the activities contravened the intent of the Treaty's
contracting parties. This Note argues that the Service's claim is incorrect. See infra notes
136-49 and accompanying text.
61. Aiken Indus. v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 925 (1971), acq. on other grounds 1972-2 C.B. 1.
62. Id. at 926.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 929. Article IX of the Convention Between the United States of America
and the Republic of Honduras for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income provided:
Interest on bonds, securities, [or] notes... from sources within one of the contracting States received by a ... corporation... of the other contracting State not
having a permanent establishment within the former State at any time during the
taxable year in which such interest is received, shall be exempt from tax by such
former State.
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with respect to Taxes on Income, June 25, 1956, art. IX, United States-Honduras, 8 U.S.T.
219, 225, T.I.A.S. No. 3766.
At the time Aiken Indus. was decided no treaty existed between the United States and
the Bahamas.
65. Aiken Indus, 56 T.C. at 926.
66. Id. at 930.
67. Id.
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treaty, 68

the opinion concluded that the Honduran corporation was
"merely a conduit" for the passage of interest payments from the U.S.
corporation to the Bahamian parent. 69 To reach this conclusion, the
court interpreted the "received by" language in article IX of the Con'70
vention to imply "complete dominion and control over the funds."
Consequently, the court denied the parent corporation an exemption
71
from withholding tax.
Aiken Industries can be distinguished from Revenue Rulings 84152 and 84-153. The tax avoidance device in Aiken Industries involved
a pre-existing debt obligation, whereas Revenue Rulings 84-152 and
84-153 did not. In addition, the Honduran subsidiary in Aiken Industries earned no profit on the transaction because the amounts it
received and paid out were identical. In Revenue Rulings 84-152
and 84-153, the Antilles subsidiaries retained a 1 percent interest
differential.
These distinctions, however, may not be sufficient to overcome
the similarities between Revenue Ruling 84-152 and Aiken Industries.
As in Aiken Industries,the ultimate lender and the ultimate borrower
72
in the Revenue Ruling were members of the same controlled group.
Also, in Revenue Ruling 84-152, the Antilles subsidiary was not sufficiently liquid to make the loan to the U.S. subsidiary without first
receiving funds from its parent. 7 3 This aggravating circumstance may
require conduit treatment. The only substantial factual difference
between Revenue Ruling 84-152 and Aiken Industries was that rather
than earn nothing on the transaction, the Antilles subsidiary in Revenue Ruling 84-152 kept a 1 percent interest differential. 74 If this 1
percent interest spread did not, along with its other activities, qualify
as a substantive business activity and if no substantial business purpose
existed, then it appears that the Service properly decided this Ruling.
On the other hand, the distinctions between Revenue Ruling 84153 and Aiken Industries are mitigating. Accordingly, the conduit
treatment of Aiken Industries may not be appropriate under the facts
of Revenue Ruling 84-153. In Revenue Ruling 84-153, the bonds were
sold in public offerings to foreign persons unrelated to the parent corporation. 75 In addition, the form of the transaction suggests a business
purpose. The Antilles subsidiary may have been an independently
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
I.R.C.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 933 (citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935)).
Id. at 934.
Id. at 933.
Id. at 934-35.
Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984 C.B. 381, 382. For a definition of "controlled group," see
§ 1563(a) (CCH 1986).
Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984 C.B. 381, 382.
Id.
Rev. Rul. 84-153, 1984-2 C.B. 383, 383.
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attractive investment so that the foreign persons bought the bonds
without guarantees from the parent corporation. 7 6 These factors suggest that the Antilles subsidiary had some degree of autonomy, indicating that it should have been treated as a separate entity.
Additionally, as in Revenue Ruling 84-152, the Antilles subsidiary in
77
Revenue Ruling 84-153 retained a 1 percent interest differential.
This retained spread, along with its other activities, may have qualified
as a substantive business activity.
5. Fixed Interest Differentials: Substantive Business Activity
Analysis
In both Revenue Ruling 84-152 and Revenue Ruling 84-153, the
Antilles subsidiary retained a 1 percent interest differential. Some
commentators contend that such a differential constitutes a substan78
tive business activity because it implies a profit-making motive.
An earlier ruling, Revenue Ruling 76-192, 79 sheds light on the
analysis of fixed-interest spreads although the Ruling involved a different issue.80 In this Ruling, a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary sold
debt obligations to underwriters for offer and sale to the public."' The
subsidiary deposited the proceeds from the sale with an unrelated foreign financial institution. 82 The foreign financial institution lent the
funds at a 1 percent higher rate to a newly formed foreign subsidiary
of the same parent.8 3 The new subsidiary then lent back the same
84
amount to the parent.
Revenue Ruling 76-192 collapsed the two steps of the transaction
and held that the foreign subsidiary selling the debt obligations had
invested in U.S. property because it indirectly held the obligation of
the domestic parent.85 In reaching this conclusion, the Ruling charac76. See Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984-2 C.B. 383. The Ruling does not state whether the
parent guaranteed the interest and principal on the obligations of the foreign finance subsidiary, the usual case in foreign finance subsidiary arrangements. Assuming such an
arrangement, the Service should have discussed this fact to bolster its position that the
Antilles subsidiary was a sham. In any event, stable corporate giants often issue debt
instruments through Antilles subsidiaries, so even without an express guarantee, foreign
bondholders may rely on the goodwill and financial backing associated with the parent
corporation.
77. Rev. Rul. 84-153, 1984-2 C.B. 383, 383.
78. See Cole & Misher, supra note 3, at 266; Fogarasi & Renfroe, supra note 3, at 446.
79. Rev. Rul. 76-192, 1976-1 C.B. 205.
80. Specifically, this Ruling considered whether the loan made by a newly formed foreign subsidiary to its domestic parent qualified under I.R.C. § 956 as an investment by
another foreign subsidiary in U.S. property. Rev. Rul. 76-192, 1976-1 C.B. 205.
81. Id. at 205.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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terized the financial institution that kept the 1 percent interest spread
as "acting... as a mere conduit" because it independently would not
have made the loan to the second subsidiary. 86 This language is similar to that of Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153.
Revenue Ruling 76-192 indicates that a 1 percent interest spread
may not be sufficient to overcome the Aiken Industries' conduit theory. Moreover, the facts of Revenue Ruling 84-152 present an even
stronger case for disregarding a corporate entity than the facts of Revenue Ruling 76-192. An unrelated foreign financial institution was
involved in Revenue Ruling 76-192, while in Revenue Ruling 84-152
all three parties to the transactions were related.8 7 Revenue Ruling 76192 did not find a tax avoidance motive for the form of the transaction, while Revenue Ruling 84-152 noted such a motive. Furthermore,
in Revenue Ruling 76-192 two steps of the transaction were collapsed.
Revenue Ruling 84-152 collapsed just one step. Finally, Revenue Ruling 84-152 indicated that the Antilles subsidiary was "not sufficiently
liquid to make the loan to [the Antilles subsidiary] out of funds other
than those obtained from [the parent corporation]." 88 This final factor
connotes that the Antilles subsidiary lacked autonomy from the parent
corporation.
Conversely, Revenue Ruling 84-153 presents a weaker case for
disregarding a subsidiary than either Revenue Ruling 76-192 or Revenue Ruling 84-152. In Revenue Ruling 84-153, unrelated foreign
bondholders were the ultimate borrowers and, presumably, the Antilles subsidiary was sufficiently liquid to make the loan to the U.S. subsidiary without first receiving the funds from the foreign
89
bondholders.
6.

The 1 PercentInterest Differential: Risk of Loss Analysis

A 1 percent interest differential may not be a sufficient business
activity for concluding that a related entity has a separate identity.
Because the 1 percent interest spread is guaranteed regardless of fluctuations in market rates, the Antilles subsidiaries in Revenue Ruling
84-152 and Revenue Ruling 84-153 did not bear the risk of changing
market conditions.
Revenue Ruling 78-11890 held that the party deemed the true
86. Id.
87. See supra note 72.
88. Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984-2 C.B. 381, 382.
89. This assumption is reasonable because Revenue Ruling 84-153, issued simultaneously with Revenue Ruling 84-152, which indicated the Antilles subsidiary was not sufficiently liquid, did not state otherwise. Rev. Rul. 84-153, 1984-2 C.B. 383.
90. Rev. Rul. 78-118, 1978-1 C.B. 219.
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obligee on the transaction was the party that bore the risk of loss.9 1 In
that Ruling, the U.S. government's Export-Import Bank served as an
intermediary in a loan agreement between a foreign corporation and a
U.S. commercial bank.92 The foreign corporation paid a flat rate of 8
93
percent interest to the Export-Import Bank on its promissory note.
The Export-Import Bank agreed to pay the commercial bank interest
on its disbursed funds at a rate of .05 percent above the commercial
94
bank's minimum commercial lending rate.
The Ruling held that the two agreements were distinct. In reaching this conclusion, the Ruling noted that neither transaction involved
all three parties, that each agreement called for a separate interest rate,
and that the interest rates were unrelated. 95 Moreover, the ExportImport Bank could make a profit on the spread between the interest
payable and the interest receivable, or it could suffer a loss depending
on market conditions.
Revenue Ruling 84-152 is distinguishable from Revenue Ruling
78-118. First, the fiat 1 percent interest spread suggests that the two
interest rates were related. Second, the transaction guaranteed the
Antilles subsidiary a gross profit of 1 percent without liability for possible economic loss. Finally, in Revenue Ruling 84-152, the Antilles
subsidiary could not make the loan to the U.S. subsidiary independently of the parent for lack of sufficient liquidity; thus, the ultimate
risk of loss rested with the parent. Based on the standards provided by
Revenue Rulings 76-192 and 78-118, Revenue Ruling 84-152 correctly
treated the loan from the parent to the Antilles subsidiary and then to
the domestic subsidiary as one transaction, thus disregarding the intermediary corporation.
Revenue Ruling 84-153 is a harder case. Even though the Antilles
subsidiary could not suffer loss on the transaction, the foreign bondholders were unrelated to the ultimate borrower. The Antilles subsidiary presumably did not require the funds from the foreign
96
bondholders before it made the loan to the U.S. subsidiary.
Although it is unlikely that the Antilles subsidiary was engaged in a
business activity as defined above, these factors may outweigh the lack
97
of business activity.
91. Id. at 220.
92. Id. at 219.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 220.
96. See supra note 89.
97. A I percent interest differential may be viewed from a different perspective. When
this differential constitutes the only profit a foreign corporation earns on funds passing
through its jurisdiction, the payment may be a royalty rather than interest income. If it is
treated as a royalty, then article VIII(l) of the United States-Antilles Treaty would not
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SubstantialBusiness Purpose

Assuming that the 1 percent interest differential retained by the
Antilles subsidiaries in Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153 does not
qualify as a "substantive business activity," a substantial business purpose for the transaction must exist to recognize the Antilles subsidiary
as a separate entity. The prevailing view is that a tax avoidance
motive can exist if the transaction's primary purpose is some legitimate motive other than tax avoidance. 98 Even a corporation formed
for a limited purpose may qualify as a separate taxable entity if it carries out that purpose. 99 The relevant question in an analysis of Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153 is whether some legitimate business
purpose for the form of the transactions outweighs any tax avoidance
motive. 1co
The mere existence of a financial intermediary in a tax haven
jurisdiction does not require disregarding the financial intermediary. 10 1 In Hospital Corp. of America v. Commissioner,10 2 the Tax
Court held that the formation of a foreign subsidiary in the Cayman
Islands, a tax haven jurisdiction, was not a sham. 10 3 The subsidiary
have applied to the payments; rather, the Tax Treaty provision relating to royalties would

have applied. Article IX of the United States-Antilles Treaty, which pertains to royalties,
provides:
Royalties for the right to use copyrights, patents, designs, secret processes and
formulae, trademarks, and other analogous property, and royalties, including rentals, in respect of motion picture films or for the use of industrial, commercial or
scientific equipment, derived from sources within one of the contracting states by a
resident or corporation of the other contracting state not engaged in a trade or
business in the former state through a permanent establishment, shall be exempt
from tax imposed by the former state.
See United States-Netherlands Income Tax Treaty, supra note 24, art. IX.
Because article IX of the Treaty does not enumerate the kind of payment involved in
Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153, the Service probably would not treat the payment as
exempt from U.S. taxation. If a particular tax treaty's royalty provision includes such a
payment, this issue may favor the taxpayer.
98. The Fifth Circuit stated:
"[To be a separate jural person for purposes of taxation, a corporation must
engage in some industrial, commercial, or other activity besides avoiding taxation:
in other words, that the term corporation will be interpreted to mean a corporation
which does some "business" in the ordinary meaning; and that escaping taxation is
not "business" in the ordinary meaning."
Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d 227, 235 (5th Cir.1970) (quoting National Investors Corp.
v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1944)).
99. See, e.g., Siegel v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 566, 576-77 (1966) (Florida food broker
formed a Panamanian corporation for the purpose of investing in a joint venture to conduct
farming operations in Cuba).
100. See supra note 5.
101. See infra note 102 and accompanying text; see also Rev. Rul. 75-118, 1975-1 C.B.
390 (the Service did not prevent the operation of the United States-Antilles Treaty where
an Antilles holding company received dividends from a wholly-owned American
subsidiary).
102. 81 T.C. 520 (1983).
103. Id. at 583-84.
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actually carried on a minimal amount of business activity." °4 The
court noted that factors other than the tax benefits could have influenced Hospital Corp. of America's ("HCA") decision to form the subsidiary in the Cayman Islands. For example, the court pointed to the
"use of English language, the familiar English law principles on which
Cayman Islands corporate law is based, the stability of the government, and the ease of communication and transportation between...
headquarters of HCA in the United States and the Cayman
05
Islands."
The Antilles provides similar non-tax advantages over other jurisdictions for the formation of foreign finance subsidiaries. Although
Dutch is the official language, English is an accepted language for
international business transactions.10 6 Incorporation in the Antilles is
07
usually inexpensive and can be accomplished quickly and easily.'
The Antilles possesses a relatively stable political and economical environment,10 8 and its developed air and shipping routes connect Europe
and the United States with South America.109 In addition, the Antilles' established banking system provides both local and international
services.110

These factors alone may not outweigh the lack of substantial business activities in Revenue Ruling 84-152. Both the ultimate lender and
borrower were members of the same controlled group. Furthermore,
the Antilles subsidiary could not have made the loan to the U.S. subsidiary without first receiving the funds from the parent
corporation."'
The analysis of Revenue Ruling 84-153 is less clear because the
form of the transaction may have been economically favorable for
non-tax business reasons." 2 In Gregory, the Supreme Court stated
that a taxpayer may adopt any lawful form of business to conduct its
operations.' 3 Subsequent cases, however, tend to require some kind
of general plan of expansion or natural division of corporate functions
104. Id. at 586.
105. Id. at 583.
106. Diamond & Diamond, supra note 16, at 18.6.
107. Id. at 18.7.
108. Id. This premise has been questioned since August 1977, when Aruban workers
staged a strike to call attention to their desire for independence from the Antilles. More
recently, economic pressures and unemployment have led to increased unrest in several
islands that comprise the Antilles. Id. at 17-18.1.
On January 1, 1986 Aruba gained separate status from the six-island federation known
as the Antilles. Id. at 20.4-.5.
109. Id. at 18.1-.2.
110. Id. at 18.3-.5.
111. Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984-2 C.B. 381, 382; see also supra text accompanying note 88.
112. See infra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
113. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 467 (1935); see also Britt v. United States, 431
F.2d 227, 234 (5th Cir.1970).

19871

REVENUE RULINGS

for recognition of the separate identity of a foreign finance subsidiary
established in a tax haven jurisdiction.1 14 For example, in Hospital
Corp. of America, HCA formed the foreign subsidiary in the Cayman
Islands as part of a general plan of expansion into foreign jurisdictions
with the Cayman Islands subsidiary being responsible for conducting
the foreign operations of HCA. 115 In Revenue Ruling 84-153, however, the Antilles subsidiary loaned money to a U.S. subsidiary and
not to another foreign subsidiary of the parent corporation.1 16 Therefore, the plan lacked the "natural" foreign or domestic division that
the court recognized as a legitimate business purpose in Hospital Corp.
1 17
of America.
Courts and the Service have recognized other business justifica118
tions for utilizing foreign subsidiaries. In Siegel v. Commissioner,
the Tax Court found that petitioner's desire to keep a domestic produce business separate from a farming venture in Cuba constituted a
legitimate motive for forming a Panamanian corporation. Revenue
Ruling 75-23119 accepted the use of a corporation because foreign
investors preferred a corporation over a limited partnership as an
investment vehicle because the investors were unfamiliar with a lim1 20
ited partnership.
Revenue Ruling 84-153 implies equally compelling business justifications for using the Antilles subsidiary to issue bonds to foreign
investors. First, the parent corporation claimed its purpose for using
the Antilles subsidiary was to obtain the lower interest rates available
on the foreign bond market. Although the subsidiary could have
issued the bonds directly after July 18, 1984, without the imposition of
withholding taxes, the reporting requirements may have caused the
transaction to be expensive and unattractive. Second, issuing the bond
through the Antilles may have attracted foreign investors seeking
secrecy in the Antilles. Third, the business of issuing bonds may have
differed substantially from the corporate activities of the U.S. subsidiary that ultimately received the proceeds from the bond sale. Fourth,
if the Antilles subsidiary engaged in many such transactions, the volume of activity could have resulted in economies of scale. Fifth, the
Antilles subsidiary may have been employed because it was financially
114. See Hospital Corp. of Am. v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 520 (1983); Ross Glove Co. v.
Comm'r, 60 T.C. 569, 588 (1953).
115. Hospital Corp. of Am., 81 T.C. at 581.
116. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
117. Hospital Corp. of Am., 81 T.C. at 582.
118. 45 T.C. 566 (1966).
119. Rev. Rul. 75-23, 1975-1 C.B. 290.
120. Id. at 291; see also Ross Glove Co. v. Comm'r, 60 T.C. 569 (1973) (recognizing a
Bahamian corporation where petitioner formed the corporation primarily to conduct a
Philippine glove manufacturing operation).
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stable and could issue the bonds to foreign investors without guarantees from the parent corporation. 12 1 Another corporation may have
lacked such financial stability. Thus, for business reasons, using the
Antilles subsidiary may have been a convenient and practical way to
structure the transaction. Finally, the transaction lacked one of the
features of many "sham" transactions because the Antilles subsidiary
was not formed specifically to engage in this transaction, but had
existed since 1982.122
These justifications may not be as compelling as those in Siegel
and Revenue Ruling 75-23 because the choice was not between corpo23
rate form and an individual proprietorship or a limited partnership.1
When aggregated, however, they present a viable argument for recognizing the separate identity of the Antilles subsidiary in Revenue Ruling 84-153. Although the Ruling does not recite all the facts relevant
to making such a determination, the facts presented do suggest that
under the traditional separate identity doctrine of "substantive business activity or substantial business purpose" the Revenue Ruling
should have recognized the Antilles subsidiary.
8. Summary of Separate Tax Identity Arguments
The holding in Revenue Ruling 84-152 is consistent with precedent disregarding a separate identity. Revenue Ruling 84-152 provides
a clear standard for avoiding "sham" treatment. A fixed percentagepoint interest spread cannot overcome the conduit nature of a loan
agreement made through a foreign finance subsidiary when both the
ultimate lender and borrower are members of the same controlled
group, or when the financial intermediary making the loan cannot do
so without first receiving the funds from another member of the controlled group. 124
Revenue Ruling 84-153, however, presents a murky standard for
planners and is likely incorrect. The Ruling's facts differ sufficiently
121. See supra note 76.
122. See, eg., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Johansson v. United States,
336 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1964).
123. The limited liability of corporations, as well as other desirable non-tax features,
may justify the choice of corporate form over another business. The choice in Revenue
Ruling 84-153 may have been between direct issuance of a bond and indirect issuance
financing through the Antilles subsidiary; or, more likely, between issuing a bond through
the domestic market having higher interest rates, or through an Antilles subsidiary on a
foreign bond market having lower interest rates. The latter choice, with its tax and other
economic advantages, is preferable.
124. The above analysis indicated that a fixed percentage-point interest differential may
never be sufficient to overcome the conduit theory. A variable interest rate seems to be
safer. See supra text accompanying notes 90-95. In addition, under a particular treaty,
treating the payment as a royalty may result in its being exempt from withholding taxes.
See supra note 97.
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from those in Aiken Industriesto cast doubt on the conclusion that the
Antilles subsidiary was "merely a conduit" for the passage of interest
payments to the foreign bondholders without some further explanation for such an assertion. Neither the ultimate borrower nor the parent corporation controlled the foreign bondholders. In addition, the
facts and circumstances of the bond offered do not support the language in the Ruling stating that the Antilles subsidiary "lacks sufficient business or economic purpose to overcome the conduit nature of
the transaction."1 2 5 The form of the transaction reflects compelling
business justifications.

B. TAx TREATY INTERPRETATION
In addition to the issue of when it is appropriate to disregard the
separate identity of a corporation, the Revenue Rulings also raise the
issue of how to interpret international tax treaties. In particular, Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153 require consideration of how to interpret specific language in a tax treaty and how to interpret generally a
treaty in ight of the contracting parties' intentions.
L

Interpretationof the "Derived... By" Language
of Article VIII(1)

An essential element of both Revenue Ruling 84-152 and Revenue
Ruling 84-153 is the interpretation of the "derived... by" language of
article VIII(l) of the United States-Antilles Treaty. 126 The interest
payments were subject to withholding tax through the interpretation
of such treaty language. Specifically, the Rulings interpreted the
words "derived... by" as implying "complete dominion and control
over the funds." 127 The general canons of treaty interpretation do not
support this finding.
It is well-settled that international tax treaties should be construed liberally to effect the intent of the parties.1 28 Specific words of a
treaty should be given a meaning that is consistent with the expectations of the contracting parties.1 29 In addition, conventions of treaty
interpretation require that ambiguous treaty language be construed
"ina broad and liberal spirit... which prefers the favoring of rights
125. See supra notes 89, 96-97, 107-11, 112-22.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
127. Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984-2 C.B. 381,381; Rev. Rul. 84-153, 1984-2 C.B. 383, 383-84.
128. See, eg., Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 52 (1963) (court should not read
the language or conceive the purpose of a treaty different from normal word usage or
domestic tax concepts); see also Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928) (principles
controlling diplomatic relations and treaties require that obligations be liberally construed
to effectuate the intention of the parties to secure equality and reciprocity).
129. Johansson v. United States, 336 F.2d 803, 813 (5th Cir.1964) (citing Maximov v.
United States, 373 U.S. 49, 56 (1963)).
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granted under it over a restrictive view of those rights.

1 30

A desire to

minimize taxes does not require automatic denial of a treaty benefit. 131
Limiting the "derived... by" language in article VIII(l) of the United

States-Antilles Treaty to imply "complete dominion and control over
the interest payment," runs contrary to the foregoing general norms of
32
treaty interpretation.1

In addition to not following the canons of treaty interpretation,
Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153 used an overly broad definition of
the treaty language, "derived ... by." The Rulings stated that such

language implies "complete dominion and control" over the interest
payment. Financial intermediaries of all types, including banks, generally use the payments received from one customer to provide funds for

another customer. The Rulings could be construed to mean that for
tax purposes any financial intermediary should be disregarded for lack

of "complete dominion and control" over the funds it borrows and relends. 133
Although the words "lack complete dominion and control over

the funds" may have some factual justification in Revenue Ruling 84130. Estate of Burghardt v. Comm'r, 80 T.C. 705, 708 (1983) (quoting Samann v.
Comm'r, 36 T.C. 1011, 1014-15 (1961), aff'd, 313 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1963)); see also Factor
v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293 (1933); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928).
131. Compagnie Financiere de Suez et de L'Union Parisienne v. United States, 492 F.2d
798, 810 (Ct.CI. 1974) (citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)); Johansson v.
United States, 336 F.2d 803, 809 (5th Cir. 1964).
132. But see Aiken Indus. v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 925, 933 (1971) (the Tax Court similarly
limited the "received... by" language of article IX of the United States-Honduras Treaty).
For a discussion of Aiken Industries, see supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
With general treaty interpretation norms favoring a more liberal meaning for "derived
... by," the Service might have relied on one notable limitation to this standard. Courts
have held that a treaty should not be interpreted so as to sweep within its protection taxpayers not clearly intended as beneficiaries. Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 56
(1963); Compagnie Financiere,492 F.2d at 810-11; Johansson, 336 F.2d at 813. This
restriction may apply to Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153 because the Rulings limit use
by third party investors of the United States-Antilles Tax Treaty. An analysis of cases that
have employed the above limitations, however, reveals that such an application would be
stretching the reasoning in existing precedent. In general, courts have used this theory to
determine, under U.S. tax law principles, which corporations and individuals can be the
beneficiaries of a tax treaty. See Maximov, 373 U.S. at 49 (concluding that a U.S. trust
whose beneficiaries were British subjects and residents was not a "resident of the United
Kingdom"); Compagnie Financiere,492 F.2d 798 (holding that the residence country of
the Suez Canal Corporation, which had substantial connections to both France and Egypt,
was Egypt); Johansson, 336 F.2d 809 (concluding that Ingmar Johansson was not a resident
of Switzerland merely because Swiss tax authorities considered him such).
Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153, however, did not question whether the Antilles
corporation fell within the purview of the treaty. Rather, they used the general, "derived
...by" language of the treaty to limit its application. In effect, the Rulings applied the
rubric that a tax treaty should not be construed so that citizens and residents of nonsignatory nations can benefit from it. However, the above precedents do not require such a
reading.
133. For a discussion of treaty interpretation in Aiken Industries, see James, supra note
3, at 142-44.
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152, that justification is weaker in Revenue Ruling 84-153. The court
in Aiken Industries stated that the phrase "complete dominion and
control" means received "as its own and not with the obligation to
transmit it to another." 134 In Revenue Ruling 84-152, the Antilles
subsidiary lacked sufficient liquidity to make the loan payment to the
domestic subsidiary independently of the loan it received from the parent. This fact supports an inference that the parent really controlled
the funds and obligated the Antilles subsidiary to lend the funds to the
domestic subsidiary. Thus, in Revenue Ruling 84-152, the Antilles
subsidiary most likely lacked "complete dominion and control" over
the interest payment.
In contrast, the Antilles subsidiary in Revenue Ruling 84-153
received from foreign bondholders the funds that it subsequently lent
to the U.S. subsidiary. Neither the U.S. subsidiary nor the U.S. parent
controlled the bondholders. The Ruling does not indicate that the
bonds were issued contingent on re-lending the proceeds. Conceivably, the Antilles subsidiary could have invested the proceeds in some
other venture. Therefore, no obligation existed to transmit the funds
to the U.S. subsidiary. As a result, the facts of Revenue Ruling 84-153
do not support a finding that the Antilles subsidiary lacked "complete
dominion and control" over the interest payment.
An additional problem with the definition applied to "derived...
by" in the subject Revenue Rulings is that this definition has the effect
of producing a bias against the United States-Antilles Treaty (and possibly other treaties that use similar language), in conflict with the
135
intentions of the contracting parties.
2. Purpose and Intent of the United States and NetherlandsAntilles
with regard to Article VIi(1) of the Treaty
Given the liberal treaty interpretation standard, the goal of treaty
interpretation should be to "apply general language to specific facts in
light of the drafters' intentions." 13 6 Generally, the purposes of bilateral tax treaties are to avoid double taxation; to remove obstacles to
the flow of trade and investment between the two signatories;1 37 and to
prevent fiscal evasion.1 38 When the legislative history of a treaty or
the language used in a treaty reveals that the parties had specific inten134. Aiken Indus., 56 T.C. at 933.
135. See Cole & Musher, supra note 3, at 268-70.
136. Osgood, Interpreting Tax Treaties in Canada, the United States, and the United
Kingdom, 17 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 255, 296 (1984).
137. Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963); Compagnie Financiere de Suez
et de L'Union Parisienne v. United States, 492 F.2d 798, 810 (Ct. C1. 1974); Johansson v.
United States, 336 F.2d 803, 813 (5th Cir. 1964).
138. Maximov, 373 U.S. at 54.
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tions in enacting or modifying certain treaty articles, courts should

look to relevant documents that reveal such specific intentions. The
holding of a case or ruling should not contradict the parties' stated
intentions.
The United States-Netherlands Protocol Modifying and Supplementing Income Tax Convention (the "Protocol") amending the
United States-Antilles Treaty, 139 and the Treasury Department's state-

ment with respect to the Protocol 1' 4 reveal the specific intentions
behind article VIII(1). The Protocol's purpose was to increase the
U.S. tax rate on dividends, interest, and royalties received from U.S.
sources by Antilles investment companies owned by persons who are
not residents of the Netherlands or Antilles.14 1 Paragraph (1) of article I provided that article VIII(1) of the convention
shall not apply to income derived from sources within the United States by any
investment or holding company,... or other entity entitled to any of the special tax benefits provided under Article 13, Article 14, or Article 14A of the
Netherlands Antilles National Ordinance on Profit Tax of 1940... or to substantially similar tax benefits granted under any law of the Netherlands Antilles .... 142

Articles 13, 14, and 14A provide a special reduced corporate tax rate
143
of 2.4 to 3.0 percent.

Significantly, the Protocol was not intended to limit the reductions in statutory tax rates on dividends, interest, and royalties paid to
corporations of the destination country to residents of the Netherlands
or Antilles. Rather, the Protocol was ratified to reduce the benefits of
the United States-Antilles Treaty to third country investors. 144
The Protocol's legislative history indicates that the Treasury
Department did not take a negative view of third country investors
who take advantage of the United States-Antilles Tax Treaty:
[W]hen residents of third countries are lured into holding their U.S. investments in a company incorporated in a treaty country through artificial reduction by that country of its own tax rates on the income, the primary purpose of
a tax treaty is subverted. Tax treaties are governmental agreements designed
to prevent double (and therefore excessive) taxation of an investor's foreign139. Protocol Modifying and Supplementing Income Tax Convention, October 23,
1963, United States-Netherlands, 15 U.S.T. 1900, T.I.A.S. No. 5665 [hereinafter The
Protocol].
140. United States Treasury Department's statement regarding the 1963 Protocol, 19651 C.B. 664 [hereinafter Treasury Department Statement].
141. The Protocol, supra note 139.
142. The Protocol, supra note 139, art. I, para. (1).
143. The regular corporate tax rate in the Antilles ranges between 24 and 30 percent.
Treasury Department Statement, supra note 140, at 668. However, special Antillean tax
rates exist for investment and holding companies. Id. at 669. Thus, prior to the Protocol,
the maximum effective tax burden for Antilles investment companies and holding companies on investment income derived by a Antilles corporation from U.S. sources was 3 percent. Id.
144. Id.
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source income by resolving conflicting jurisdictional claims to tax which arise
because one country is the source of the income and the other is the residence
of the recipient. Exemptions and reductions in source taxation provided for by
treaty are reciprocal revenue adjustments between governments designed to
implement a tax credit for foreign taxes paid. They are not intended to reduce
the tax burden of the investor, as it is assumed that the tax
waived by the
1 45
source country will be imposed by the destination country.

This statement indicates the Treasury Department's belief that if the
Antilles subsidiary paid the regular Antilles corporate tax rate, then
the benefits of the United States-Antilles Treaty would be available to
third country investors.
The United States and the Antilles considered curtailing all
treaty benefits to third country investors when negotiating the Protocol. However, this action would have been less favorable to the United
States than the solution the Protocol eventually reached.
In recommending ratification of article I of the protocol, the Treasury continues to recognize the desirability of encouraging foreign portfolio investment in
the United States during our present imbalance of international payments. To
this end, care has been taken not to remove from the treaty those provisions(such
as the exemption ofNetherlandsAntilles corporationsfrom the so-called "secondary tax" on dividends and interest paid by them to persons other than
U.S.persons) which have long been an intended benefit of the United States
146
treaty program.

These statements indicate that the United States encouraged third
country investment in the Antilles, provided that the special reduced
tax benefits were not available to such third country residents.
Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153 state that such special tax
benefits did not apply to the Antilles subsidiaries.' 47 In light of the
Protocol and the Treasury Department statement regarding the Protocol, Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153 are inconsistent with the
intent of the contracting parties. The Rulings have the effect of limiting the use of the United States-Antilles Treaty by persons from third
1 48
countries in a way specifically rejected by the Protocol.
It appears that what the Service really objected to was not the
form of the transaction, but the fact that the foreign bondholders, who
145. Id.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984-2 C.B. 381, 382; Rev. Rul. 84-153, 1984-2 C.B. 383, 383.
148. See Cole & Musher, supra note 3, at 270-71. This analysis is supported by the
following analogy. Article VII(l) of the United States-Antilles Treaty, which allowed for a
reduction in the dividend withholding tax from 15 percent to 5 percent, provided that
"such reduction of the rate shall not apply if the relationship of the two corporations has
been arranged or maintained primarily with the intention of securing such reduced rate."
United States-Netherlands Income Tax Treaty, supranote 24, art. VII(l). Revenue Ruling
79-65, 1979-1 C.B. 458, held that the domestic corporation must provide information,
when requested by the Service, to establish that its relationship with its Antilles parent was
not arranged, or maintained, primarily with the intent of securing the reduced rate. Id.
Thus, art. VII(l) and the above Revenue Ruling indicate that if the Treasury Department
wanted to limit the application of art. VIII(l), it knew how to accomplish this objective.
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were neither citizens of the Netherlands nor the Antilles, received the
tax benefits of a treaty to which their home nations were not parties.
Renegotiation of the Tax Treaty, as provided in article XXV(2) of the

Treaty, would have been a more forthright method of curbing this perceived abuse. 149
C.

UNILATERAL TREATY OVERRIDE

Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153 may affect not only transac-

tions between the United States and the Antilles, but also relations
with other countries with which the United States maintains bilateral
tax treaties. This broad effect reflects in part the fact that the Revenue
Rulings imputed the requirements necessary for nonapplication of
withholding taxes under code sections 871(h) and 881(c) to the United
States-Antilles Treaty. In doing so, the Ruling unilaterally overrode
the existing treaty even though Congress did not mandate such a
150
result in enacting the 1984 Act.
Although U.S. tax treaties are not statutes, "they have equal dignity with statutes under the Constitution." 151 Accordingly, the Code
provides that its provisions shall not apply when they are contrary to
existing treaty obligations. 152 Code section 894(a) establishes the
supremacy of treaty tax exemptions. 153 A treaty may be modified by a
subsequent act of Congress. 154 Nevertheless, when a treaty and a statute relate to the same subject, courts will attempt to interpret them so
as to give effect to both. 155 Subsequent legislation should not be interpreted to modify an earlier treaty unless it is clearly Congress'
intent. 156

With regard to the instant Revenue Rulings, there is no evidence
that Congress intended to impute U.S. tax treaties in general, or the
United States-Antilles Treaty in particular, with the reporting require149. Article XXV(2) of the United States-Antilles Treaty provided: "Should any difficulty or doubt arise as to the interpretation or application of the present Convention, the
competent authorities shall undertake to settle the question by mutual agreement." See
United States-Netherlands Income Tax Treaty, supra note 24, art. XXV(2).
150. See Fogarasi & Renfroe, supra note 3, at 444-45.
151. Osgood, supra note 136, at 263.
152. I.R.C. § 7852(d) (CCH 1986).
153. I.R.C. § 894 (a) provides that "[i]ncome of any kind, to the extent required by any
treaty obligation of the United States, shall not be included in gross income and shall be
exempt from taxation under this subtitle." Id. § 894(a).
154. See, eg., Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884); Estate of Burghardt v.
Comm'r, 80 T.C. 705, 713 (citing Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 45 (1951)).
155. Burghardt, 80 T.C. at 713 (citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)).
156. Id ; see I.R.C. §§ 897(i), 269B(d) (CCH 1986). These two I.R.C. sections evidence
clear intent to abrogate treaty obligations. See also Langer, Override of Tax Treaties by
OrdinaryLegislation, 34 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 552 (1980).
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ments called for in the repeal sections.1 57 Therefore, the Treaty withholding tax exemption should prevail regardless of the repeal.
Since the Code's repeal provisions were imputed into article
VIII(l) of the Treaty, the treaty provided no benefit to taxpayers not
otherwise available under the Code. The contracting parties intended
article VIII(l) to provide benefits not available under U.S. tax law in
an attempt to facilitate commerce and improve the United States' balance of payments problem. 158 Therefore, the Rulings are contrary to
the intent of the United States and the Antilles in enacting article
VIII(l) of the Treaty.
The Service issued Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153 after
the repeal of withholding taxes on portfolio interest. The Service
knew that its action would lead to direct investment in foreign debt
instruments rather than investment through Antilles subsidiaries. 159
Because the actions of individuals and corporations are not always
predictable, the Rulings might well have adversely affected the Antil1 60
les' economy.
Finally, the Service issued the Rulings after the United States
encouraged the use of foreign finance subsidiaries in the Antilles to
alleviate the United States' imbalance of payments. 16 1 The abrupt
change of policy in Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153 may prove
detrimental not only to relations with the Antilles, but also to tax
treaty negotiations with other countries. Countries viewing this action
may conclude that the United States only honors tax treaty obligations
when beneficial to its own national interests and not when treaty partners rely on such obligations.' 62 This action runs contrary to the general U.S. policy of discussing changes in its revenue posture with
treaty partners before such changes are made,1 63 and then phasing
157. See, eg., CONFERENCE REPORT ON THE DEFCrr REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, H.R.
REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 2D
SEss., TAX TREATMENT OF INTEREST PAID TO FOREIGN INVESTORS (Comm. Print 1984);
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., EXPLANATIONS OF PRO-

VISIONS APPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE ON MARCH 21, 1984, at 416-24 (Comm. Print

1984).
158. See supra notes 136-49 and accompanying text.
159. Because of the favorable investment features of the Antilles, the Antilles government relied on the United States-Antilles Tax Treaty as a major source of its revenue. By
1984, an estimated 25 percent of Antilles governmental revenues were linked to the United
States-Antilles income tax convention. Zagaris, Congress Repeals the 30% Withholding Tax
on Interest-Troublefor the Antilles, 56 TAXES INT'L 18, 22 (June 1984).
160. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 136-49 and accompanying text.
162. Continued approval of article VIII(l) of the Treaty would not have adversely
affected the United States, especially in light of the repeal of the 30 percent tax on portfolio
interest. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
163. But see Rosenbloom, Tax Treaty Interpretation,34 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 543, 545 (1980); see also Brockway, Override of Tax Treaties by Ordinary
Legislation, 34 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 553, 554 (1980).
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them in gradually. 164
The Treasury Department began renegotiating the United StatesAntilles Treaty in 1980 in an effort to stop perceived abuses of the
Treaty. 165 This attempt was unsuccessful in part because of strong
166
opposition from both U.S. citizens and the Antilles government.
Finally, on August 8, 1986, a new income tax treaty between the
United States and the Antilles was signed. 167 The Tax Treaty should
have been renegotiated before the Service embarked on the drastic
course outlined in Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153.
V.

CONCLUSION

The holding of Revenue Ruling 84-152 is correct despite its faulty
analysis. An analysis of the precedents dealing with the separate identity of an entity would have yielded the same result. Revenue Ruling
84-152's analysis should have been limited to factors such as the substantive business activity test, risk of loss, and substantive business
purpose. There was simply no need for the Ruling to violate established treaty interpretation conventions and to unilaterally override an
existing tax treaty. A fixed percentage-point interest spread is not sufficient business activity to meet the substantive business activity test.
This activity involved no apparent risk of loss. A substantive business
purpose for using a foreign finance intermediary is not evident when
the ultimate lender and ultimate borrower are members of the same
controlled group and the intermediary does not independently possess
sufficient funds to make the loan without first receiving the capital
from another member of the controlled group.
Revenue Ruling 84-153 presents a harder case. Unfortunately,
the Ruling does not provide adequate facts to conclude positively that
the Antilles subsidiary was engaged in a substantive business activity
or was formed for a substantial business purpose. The facts presented,
however, support the conclusion that the Ruling was incorrectly
decided based on the precedents underlying the separate identity doctrine, general canons of treaty interpretation, and the legislative history of the 1963 Protocol.
Finally, the Service issued these Rulings without consulting or
considering the possible economic impact on the Antilles. This is a
dangerous precedent and bad policy, especially when dealing with gov164. See Brockway, supra note 163; Langer, supra note 156. The Code changes provided in I.R.C. §§ 897,269B (CCH 1986) and the 1963 Protocol were phased in gradually.
165. Gelinas, supra note 5, at 242.
166. United States corporations feared losing access to the foreign bond market, and the
Antilles government was concerned about loss of jobs and revenues directly attributable to
the existing tax treaty.
167. See supra note 24.
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ernments of small nations whose economies can be easily jolted by
such abrupt policy changes. Therefore, courts and the Service should
treat the standards and analyses used in Revenue Rulings 84-152 and
84-153 as an aberration and accordingly should not follow them in the
future.
Deborah G. Rosenthal

